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CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL

DECISION-MAKING BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE

DR. CHRISTOPH HENKEL, LL.M.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War and, indeed, at the beginning of this
century, the European Union is being challenged with both an increasing
number of members and by those countries who aspire for future
membership. Established among six Member States as the European Coal
and Steel Community, the European Union now consists of fifteen Member
States and is faced with the application for membership of at least thirteen
additional countries.' President Clinton, when presented with the prestigious
Charlemagne Prize for promoting European unity in June 2000, even called
for the full inclusion of Russia into the European Union.' He stated: "No
door can be sealed shut to Russia, not NATO's, not the European Union's."I
As this message demonstrates, the ever-changing character and
definition of Europe remains today as it has in past centuries.' Moreover, it
proves that in an age of constitutionalism, European integration and the
European Union in particular cannot avoid such development. The European
Community Treaties do not provide a template for a constitution in the typical
sense of the law. Furthermore, the institutional framework of the Union was
laid out by the European Community Treaties in the 1950's, only to be
partially amended in the 1980's and 1990's. Accordingly, it is highly
questionable whether the European Union will be able to meet the challenge
of future enlargement. An increase to thirty members may jeopardize the
achieved European integration among the fifteen Member States and
aggravate the already existent deficit in democratic decision-making. Aware
of this danger, the Member States of the European Union have entered into

Austria, Finland and Sweden were admitted to the European Union in 1995. Since early 1998,
the European Union has been negotiating on membership with Poland, Hungary. the Czech
Republic. Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. Other countries who have applied for membership are:
Turkey, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Applications by Switzerland
and Norway have been withdrawn.
See, e.g.. Clinton hilt Pladoyer fur Moskau: US-Prdsident bejaht EU-Beitritt/Putin regi
gemeinsame Raketenabwehr an, Frankfurter Rundschau, June 3, 2000, at A].
Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Urges United Europe to Include Russia, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2000, at
A6.
See, e.g., J.G.A Pocock, What Do We Mean by Europe?, WQ, Winter 1997, 12-29.
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a renewed debate on the constitutionalism of the European Union and the
amendment of its treaties.
In late May of 2000, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer,
presented his vision for future constitutionalism of the European Union in a
speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin.' As the final goal, Mr. Fischer
called for a European federation of nation-states, with atwo-house parliament
and the option of a directly elected president, to be underwritten by a new
treaty and a European Constitution. He stated that a European Constitution
should include fundamental, human and civil rights. Furthermore, Mr.
Fischer pledged that constitutionalism of the European Union must not put
an end to the European nation-state. He said, "in a [European federation] we
will remain British and German, French and Polish.'
The focus of this article shall be the case law of the European Court
of Justice. Despite recent proposals as well as other actions of the Member
States to reform the Community Treaties, the expansion ofjudicial review by
the European Court of Justice remains the driving force behind the
development of constitutionalism of the European Union.' In fact, the
European Court of Justice and its case law play the most dominant and
consistent role in the integration process. 1I1
doing so, the case law of the
Court of Justice in part reflects the judicial activism comparable to early U.S.
Supreme Court assertions of federal power." With the doctrines of direct
applicability, direct effect, supremacy of Community Law, fundamental
rights, and implied powers, the Court of Justice indicates a bias toward deeper
European integration and centralized governance. To be sure, the
establishment and subsequent elaboration of these doctrines provide a
primary example for the role of the European Court of Justice in the
European Union. The precedents of the Court, which in many cases were
Charlemagne: Joschka Fischer, Germany's flighty foreign minister, The Economist, May 20th-May
26th, 2000, at 66; Vorwarts bis zur Vollendung vom Staatenbund zur FOderation: Mit seiner Rede in
der Berliner Humboldt Universitat leitet der Aullenminister Joschka Fischer neues Nachdenken uber
Europa eih,
Frankfurter Rundschau, June 17, 2000, Dokumentation, at A7.
"

7

Id
RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRATION

36-66 (St. Martin Press) (1998). Leila Sadat Wexeler, The Role of the European Courtof Justice on
the way to European Union, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVES 159-175 (Paul Michael Lutzeler ed., 1994); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,2413 (1991); Francois Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community
Law Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, 56 MOD.L.REV. 19-54 (1993); L. NEVILLE
BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 295-375 (1995);

G. F.Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.595-614 (1989);
Eric Stein, Lawvyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM.J. INT'L. L 1-27
(1981).
HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 115-143 (Martinus Nijhoff) (1986).
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initiated by the Member States themselves or a direct result of their failure to
comply with obligations under the Treaties, prove a consistent reliance on the
Court to regulate political conflict throughout the European integration
process. But aside from its role in European integration, it should also be
noted that the activism of the European Court of Justice as an international
court may provide general insight into the greater picture of international
jurisprudence. That is, the possible influence of international jurisdiction on
the sovereignty of nation-states bound by international agreements and
international organizations.
II. CASE LAW AND DOCTRINES OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
A. COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

Before discussing the different doctrines developed by the European
Court of' Justice, it is necessary to describe the broad structure and
composition of the Court. The Court consists of the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance., The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is
limited to certain classes of actions or proceedings brought by natural or legal
persons and is primarily meant for establishing facts.", The interpretation,
validity and application of Community Law is only judged by the Court of
Justice."
Since the admission of Finland, Sweden and Austria as new
members to the European Union in 1995, the Court of Justice is comprised
of fifteen judges; one judge per Member State.' 2 The deliberations of the
Court must be held with an uneven number of members. Certain issues can
be decided by a Chamber of the Court. Issues deliberated outside the
Chamber require a minimum quorum of seven judges." The judges are
appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States,"
which requires a unanimous decision." The mandate of a common accord

12

13

EC Treaty, art. 225 (ex. art. 168a).
EC Treaty, art. 225 (ex. art. 168a); See also The Rules of Procedure of the European Court of
First Instance 1991 O.J. (L 136).
EC Treaty, art. 220 (e art. 164).
Act Concerning the Conditions ofAccession of the United Kingdom Norway, the Republic ofAustria,
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom ofSweden, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 24. Bull. EU "-1995, at 130,
point 1.9.19. - 1.9.20. Note that Norway, after a negative referendum did not join the European Union
in 1995.
HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENiS F. WAELBROECK,

COMMUNITIES 447
'

JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN

§ 771 (Kluwer Law and Taxation) (5th ed. 1992).

EC Treaty, art. 223 (ex. art. 167).
DEHOUSSE, supra note 7, at 7.
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suggests a greater independence of the judges, and it prevents them from
being considered mere representatives of their state.'" Yet, in practice each
Member State proposes a candidate of its own nationality and it has been
demonstrated that appointed judges are inclined to support their own States,"
thus clearly manifesting a political aspect in the recruitment procedure of the
members of the Court." The judges are appointed for six years and can be
reappointed without term restriction." The appointments are made every
three years, for a group of six or seven judges, in order to ensure that the
Court operates in an undisturbed manner.2 '
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY LAW
Tile European Court of Justice promoted the effectiveness of
Community law through the doctrines of direct applicability and direct
effect.',

Often used in the same context, both doctrines should be

distinguished.22
The doctrine of direct applicability refers to Treaty provisions or
regulations, while the doctrine of direct effect, noted particularly in the latest
case law by the Court," primarily applies to directives.
The wider legal concept of direct effect is the basis for the distinction
between the doctrine of direct applicability and direct effect. While sharing
the terminology with one doctrine, the concept of direct effect is inherent to
'6

Id.

'7

SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 13, at 451

§ 774.

DEHOUSSE, supra note 7, at 7-8.
',
SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 13, at 451 § 779.
I"
Id. at 452 § 780.
21 In terms of U.S. case law, both doctrines may be best compared to U.S. Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the issue of intent and purpose. One such example is Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 264-268 (1977).
22 BENGT BEUTLER ET AL., DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION. RECHTSORDNUNG UND POLITIK 206 (Nomos)
(1993).
21 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, [1991] E.C.R. I-

24

2.

5357; Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury, Cx parte: British Telecommunication plc,
[ 1996] ECR 1-1631 , Joined Cases C- 178/94, C- 179/94, C- 188/94, C- 189/94 and C- 190/94,
Erich Dillenkofer and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4845.
Along with decisions, recommendations, and opinions, regulations and directives are the main
legislative tools of the Community. Regulations become effective in their entirety, without any
intervention by Member States and automatically become part of national law. Directives, in
contrast, require transformation into national law by the Member States. By definition directives
are only binding as of the result to be achieved and leave the choice of form and methods to the
national authorities of each Member States. See EC Treaty, art. 189.
Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. I, 11-13: "The very nature of
[Article 12] makes it ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between
the Member States and their subjects .... "
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both doctrines. In the understanding of the Court, direct effect generally
relates to the fact that Community law provisions, regardless of their character
as a regulation, directive or Treaty provision, contain the possibility of
creating individual rights for natural and legal persons which may be
protected by national courts. Therefore, provisions which are directly
2
applicable under the doctrine of direct applicability constitute direct effect. '
Having made this conclusion, the need for a clear distinction
between both doctrines appears somewhat questionable. However, despite
being the connecting link between the two doctrines, the general concept of
direct effect furnishes an independent and fundamental importance of its
own.2' This proves more imperative as even the Community Treaties fail to
provide a uniform and unambiguous basis on the scope and the binding
obligations of the Treaties as well as the law enacted thereafter." While the
Community Treaties indicate that Community law is directly applicable
within the domestic legal order of the Member States," some Member States
contest this notion and consider a separate act of incorporation to be required.
The concept of direct effect tries to solve this controversy by establishing
specific guidelines under which Community laws become the law of the land
without a formal act of incorporation.' The doctrines of direct applicability
and direct effect are the utilization of these guidelines under different
circumstances. These differences will now be discussed in detail.
1. DirectApplicability
The doctrine of direct applicability postulates that the adoption of
legal norns by Community institutions is sufficient to integrate them into the
legal orders of the Member States.' Community enactments of that kind need
not be transposed or incorporated into a Member States law to become the
law of the land." Moreover, direct applicability means that the rules of
Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States
from the date of their entry into force for as long as they continue in force.
26

Case 34/73, F.Iii Variola Spa v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1973] E.C.R. 981, 990-

2'

991, 8-10.r
See, e.g., J. A. Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in

2'

2'

Community Law, 9 COMMON. MKT. L. REV. 425, 425-426 (1972).
BEUTLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 206; A. J. Easson, The "direct effect" of EEC directives,
JCLQ 319 (1979).
EC Treaty, art. 249 (ex. art. 189).

See the different cases as referred to in the different paragraphs below.
a' George A. Bernann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community
and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 348 (1994).
92 Case 34/73, F.Ili Variola Spa v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1973] E.CR. 981,
991,
"'

10

Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal
These provisions are a direct source of rights and duties for all those affected
thereby, whether Member States or individuals?
The concept of direct applicability is most clearly demonstrated by
the legislative tool of regulations, which, according to the European
Community Treaty, "have general application. [A Regulation] shall be
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."' , The
meaning of the concept of direct applicability is not limited however to
regulations. It also applies to provisions of the Founding or Community
Treaties. Above all, the Community Treaties entitle and obligate Member
States and their institutions as well as the European Community and their
different organizations."
The rule of direct applicability was established by the Court in the
case Van Gend en Loos " in 1963. A Dutch businessman objected to the
imposition of a certain duty tariff by Dutch customs authorities on a quantity
of products imported from Germany." He claimed that this would violate
Community law.,, The European Court of Justice found that "[tlhe
implementation of Article 12 does not require any legislative intervention on
the part of the states. The fact that under this Article it is the Member States
who are made the subject of the negative obligation does not imply that their
nationals cannot benefit from this obligation."', The Court did not limit the
application of the doctrine of direct applicability to provisions entailing
negative obligations or obligations to omit restriction by the Member States."
The Court ruled it sufficient if the Treaty provisions impose an ample
obligation to act upon Member States." Such obligation might even exist in
cases in which Treaty provisions remain vague or contain an indeterminate
concept of law. 2
Since the end of the transitional period of the European
Communities, the doctrine of direct applicability took on additional
importance. The Founding Fathers intended to establish the common market
Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (11),[1978] E.C.R.
629, 43-644, 13-24.
EC Treaty, art. 249 (ex art. 189).
EC Treaty, art, 5 (ex art. 3b), art. 10 (ex art. 5); TEU art. 6 (ex art. F).

1

'
"

Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1.
Id at 4, 5.

1

Id
Id. at 13,

42

Id. at 13, 1.
Id at 13, 3; See also Case 57/65, Altons Lttticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, [1966]
E.C.R. 205, 210-211; Case 33/70, SpA Sace v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic,
[1970] E.C.R. 1213, 1221-1223; Case 45/75, Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel - GroBhandels
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz, [1976] E.C.R. 181, 193, 9, 197, 24.
BEUTLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 208.

IX

'

2.
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during a transitional period of twelve years ending on December 31, 1969."
The goal of establishing a common market was never fully achieved during
this period, and as a result, the European Court of Justice moved forward to
grant direct applicability to those Treaty provisions which were determined
to adjust or abolish discriminations and restrictions in the course of the
transitional period." This included not only the four freedoms of the
Community, the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital," but
also those provisions which specify a clear legislative aim, such as the
principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work.,
The standards by which the European Court of Justice established its
case law, however, remained inconsistent. This is apparent in the cases
Reyners and Van Binsbergen.

Both cases dealt with the abolition of

restrictions in two areas of Community law: discrimination based on
nationality between workers of Member States and the freedoms of
establishment and service." Although the aim of the Treaty is clearly defined

in both areas, the European Court of Justice found that a distinction is
necessary. While discrimination against nationals of other Member States
was prohibited on the basis of directly applicable Treaty provisions, the
concept of direct applicability was not extended to Treaty provisions on the

freedom of establishment and service. The Court held that the freedom of
4'

EEC Treaty, art. 7.

EEC Treaty, art. 37(l): "Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a
commercial character so as to ensure that when the transitional period has ended no
discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exist
between nationals of Member States."; EEC Treaty, art. 48(l): "Freedom of movement shall be
secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period."; EEC Treaty, art. 52:
"[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory
of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional
period .... "
4 See, e.g., Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, [1974] E.C.R. 631, 648-652, 3-32; Case
33/74, Johannes Henricus van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrifsvereiniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, 1310-1312, $ 18-27, Case 59/75, Pubblico Ministero v.
Flavia Manghera and Others, [1976] E.C.R. 91, 101, 14-16; Case 45/75, Rewe-Zentrale des
Lebensmittel - Grol3handels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz, [1976] E.C.R. 181, 197-198,
22-24, Case 91/75, Hauptzollamt Gottingen and Bundesfinanzminister v. Wolfgang Miritz
GmbH & Co., [1976] E.C.R. 217, 229-231, 7-12,
16
EC Treaty, art. 119: "Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal
work .. "; See also Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige De Navigation
Aerienne Sabena, [1976] E.C.R. 455, 471-480, 4-68.
7 Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, [1974] E.C.R. 631; Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus
van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrifsvereiniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] E.C.R.
1299.
EC Treaty, arts. 43-55 (ex arts. 52-66). EC Treaty, art. 39(2) (ex art. 48(2)) states: "[The]
freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality
between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other
conditions of work and employment."
"
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establishment and service depend on a simplification of national laws and
administrative rules which would require a previous qualification through
Community directives.',
Another example of inconsistency can be found in the Defrenne'
ruling of the Court. Defrenne, a flight attendant with Sabena Airlines, was
required by her contract to cease employment for reasons of her age."
Defrenne brought action against Sabena in a Belgian labor court and invoked
the right to equal pay for equal work under the provisions of the Community
Treaty." The European Court of Justice held:
that the principle of equal pay contained in [EC Treaty]
Article 119 may be relied upon before the national courts and
that these courts have the duty to ensure the protection of the
rights which this protection vests in individuals, in particular
as regards those types of discrimination arising directly from
legislative provisions or collective labour agreements, as well
as in cases in which men and women receive unequal pay for
equal work which is carried out in the same establishment or
service whether private or public."
Affirming direct applicability with this ruling, the Court limited
direct applicability with regard to the legal consequences of its judgment. The
Court found that under considerations of legal certainty affecting all the
interests involved, no direct applicability should be given in support of claims
prior to the date of the Court's judgment.,
2. Direct Effect
As described above in the case of regulations and certain Treaty
provisions, it is not necessary for Member States to pass any domestic laws
in order to implement them. Community law of that kind is directly
applicable by the Member States and legally binding in its entirety. Thus,
regulations and parts of the Community Treaty are creating enforceable legal
,

"
i2

"

Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, [1974] E.CR. 631, 648-652, 6-32, Case 33/74,
Johannes Hlenricus van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrifsvereiniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, 1309-1310, 12-14.
Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige De Navigation Adrienne Sabena,
[1976] E.C.R. 455.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 457-458.
IId at 476, 40.
Id at 480-481, 69-75.
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obligations, making them directly effective between the Member States and
individuals or among individuals. While the vertical category of effectiveness
refers to rights that an individual may invoke against a Member State, the
horizontal effect allows a person to bring an action against other individuals
or corporations." Such effect, however, is not limited to regulations and parts
of the Community Treaties. The European Court of Justice has long held that
directives may also have direct effect. This is referred to as the doctrine of
direct effect. l
At first glance, the introduction of direct effect for directives seems
questionable and contradictory. The Community Treaties clearly define
directives as "binding, as of the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form or methods."" As a result, directives can create little more
than a framework while their effectiveness and content would depend on
national transformation and discretion.
In contrast to regulations, the application of direct effect to directives
is more problematic. The Community Treaties do not provide for a
distinctive answer, which was also recognized by the European Court of
Justice. In the case of Van Duyn v. Home Office," the Court held that
[S]ince Article 189 of the Treaty distinguishes between the
effects ascribed to regulations, directives, and decisions, it
must... be presumed that the Council in issuing a directive
rather than making a regulation, must have intended that the
directive should have an effect other than that of a regulation
and accordingly that the former should not be directly
applicable."
Despite this conclusion, the Court at the same time furnishes the idea
that other categories of acts as well as directives might have similar effects.",
With regard to the binding effects of directives as to the result to be achieved,
the Court found it incompatible "to exclude, in principle,the possibility" that
directives may be invoked by those concerned." The Court emphasized the
possibility of direct effect where Community authorities impose an obligation

55

BEUTLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 211.

"

DEHOUSSE, supra note 7, at 39-40.
EC Treaty, art. 249(3) (ex art 189(3)).
Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.CR. 1337.
ild. at 1348, 11.
Id. at 1348, 12.

"

ld. Emphasis added.

'56

"
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on Member States to pursue a particular course of conduct.'2 In the view of
the Court, the useful effect of directives would be weakened if both
individuals were prevented from relying on directives before national courts
and national courts were hindered from taking directives into consideration
as an element of Community law' Accordingly, the Court held that "it is
necessary to examine, in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and
wording of the provision in question are capable of having direct effects on
the relations between Member States and individuals.1'"

While establishing the general possibility of direct effect for
directives, the Court continued to lay down conditions under which a
directive may have such effect. Remaining somewhat ambiguous in Van
Duyn,'6 the Court qualified those conditions later in Becker v. Finanzamt
Miinster-Innenstadt." There the Court ruled that "wherever the provisions of
a directive appear ...

to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those

provisions may, in te absence of implementing measures adopted within the
prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is
incompatible with the directive .

. . .",

As it stands, the three conditions

under which directives may have direct effect in the case law of the European
Court of Justice are: (a) unconditionality, (b) sufficient clarity and precision,
and (c) nonexistence of discretion for national implementation.
In a further step, the Court also established the rule that a Member
State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by a
directive in the prescribed period may not rely on its own failure to perform
the obligations which the directives entail. This failure includes the
prohibition against Member States to apply their internal law which has not
yet been adapted in compliance with the directive, which will apply even if
the law in question is provided with penal sanctions. On the other hand, a
6,2
",

64
6,

''

61

"

Id.
As an additional argument, the Court notes the very characteristic of judicial review through
preliminary rulings by the Court (EC Treaty, art. 177), "which empowers national courts to refer
to the Court questions concerning the validity and interpretation of all acts of the Community
institutions" thus "impl[ying] ...that these acts may be invoked by individuals in national
courts." Id. at 1348, 12.
Id
The Court thereby relied on two main conditions: "First, the [directive] lays down an obligation
which is not subject to any exception or condition and which, by its very nature, does not require
the intervention of any act on the part either of the institutions of the Communities or of Member
States. Secondly, because Member States are thereby obliged, in implementing a clause which
derogates from one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty in favor of individuals, not to
take account if factors extraneous to personal conduct, legal certainty for the persons concerned
requires that they should be able to rely on this obligation even though it has been laid down in
a legislative act which has no automatic direct effect in its entirety." Id. at 1348, 13.
Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-lnnenstadt, [1982] E.CR. 53.
Id. at 71.
Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v.Tullio Ratti, [1979] E.CR. 1629.
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directive may not be legally effective before the expiration of the period
prescribed for its implementation.""
That said, it is important to note that direct effect of directives poses
a problem. Directives have no horizontal direct effect. Consequently, they
cannot directly impose obligations on private parties. As stated above, they
are addressed to Member States and can only constitute obligations for
Member States and their organs.' Hence, an individual can only bring an
action against a publicly owned or publicly run enterprise which must be
"[s]ubject to the authority or control of the states or had special powers
beyond those which results from the normal relations between individuals.""
The rejection of horizontal direct effect seems arbitrary and unfair, as it
distinguishes between rights of State employees and those of private
employees. The Court of Justice found no merit in this argument. It held that
such a distinction may easily be avoided if a Member State concerned has
correctly implemented the directive into national law."
However, the limitation of direct effect by the Court does not
completely preclude rules of directives from being invoked against a Member
State. A private party may even use the disregard of directives by Member
States as a defense in a lawsuit pending in national court. In fact, the Court
of Justice created an interpretive obligation which requires national courts to
interpret national law in conformity with Community law," thus indirectly
conferring horizontal direct effect upon directives."
(A). The Subsequent Elaborationof DirectEffect
The European Court of Justice has elaborated the doctrine of direct
effect in its most current case law. This is of importance in demonstrating the
Court's continuing effort toward judicial legislation.
In the words of the Court: "[li]t is not possible for an individual to plead the principle of
'legitimate expectation' before the expiry of the period prescribed for its implementation." Id.
at 1645, 46.
"
Case 152/84, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hamshire Area Health Authority
(Teaching), [1986] E.CR. 723, 749, 48; Case 91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v.Recreb Sre, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-3325, 3355-3358, 19-30.
7 Case 188/89, A. Foster and Others v.British Gas plc., [1990] E.C.R. 1-3313, 3348, 18.
72 Id.
73 Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n SA, [1990] E.C.R.
1,4135, 4158-4159, 7-9; Case 91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v.Recreb Sre, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325,
3357, 26; Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land NordrheinWestfalen, [1984] E.C.R 1891, 1909, 26.
"

"

LEONARD JASON-LLOYD & SUKHWINDER BAJWA, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION 47 (Cromwell Press) (1997); Christiaan W.A. Timmermans, Application of Community
Law by National Courts: (Limits to) Direct Effect and Supremacy, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF
THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY 29 (Rosa H.M. Jansen et al. eds., 1997).
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Under the case law of the Court, certain conditions of a directive
might grant enforceable rights upon individuals despite the fact that the
directive as a whole does not satisfy the conditions of direct effect. This is
true with regard to claims of state liability arising from the failure of Member
States to implement directives. Significantly, Community law entitles a
person to whom such failure causes injury to recover damages from the state
in national courts."
The case of Francovich v. Italy illustrates this development.' 6 Two
Italian workers found themselves unable to collect salary owed to them by
their bankrupt employers." After unsuccessfully attempting to enforce a
judgment by national courts, the workers eventually brought proceedings
against Italy in which they claimed, in view of the obligation and the failure
to implement a Community law directive, Italy should be ordered to pay them
their arrears of wages or, in the alternative, to pay compensation." The
directive in question was aimed at giving protection to workers affected by
the insolvency of their employers."
In its decision, the Court repeated its language in Becker v.
Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt" and further considered whether the
provisions of the directive were unconditional and sufficiently precise."
Affirming this test, the Court turned to the third condition of Becker,
addressing the question of Member State discretion for the national
implementation of directives."' The Court found that the directive gave the
Member States sone discretion with regard to the means of establishing
workers protection against their bankrupt employers."
Rather than
concluding that the directive does not satisfy the third condition under
Becker, the Court noted that "the right of a State to choose among several
possible means of achieving the result required by a directive does not
preclude the possibility for individuals of enforcing before national courts
rights whose contents can be determined sufficiently precisely on the basis of
7

Marc Fierstra, The Significance of the Francovich Jurisprudence for the National Courts, in
EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY I II (Rosa H.M. Jansen et al. eds., 1997).

Joined Cases 6/90 and 8/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357.
Id. at 5360, 3-4.
7
Id.
7, In a previous law suit before the Court of Justice, Italy had already been recorded to be in default
for failure to transpose a directive into national law. See Case 22/87, Commission of the
European Communities v. Italian Republic, [1989] E.C.R. 143. The directive in question,
Directive 80/987, particularly aimed to set up a system of salary protection. See 1980 O.J. (L
283)23.
''
Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v.Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, [19821 E.C.R. 53, 72.
't Joined Cases 6/90 and 8/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,
5408, 11-14,
"
Id. at 5409, 15.
Id at 5409-5410, 17.
'"
17
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the provisions of the directive alone."', In other words, the Court emphasized
the importance of the first two conditions of unconditional and sufficient
clarity under the Becker ruling, while at the same time diluting the
significance of the third, Member State discretion for the implementation of
directives. The fact that Member States might have discretion with regard to
the means for the transposition of directives does not affect the precise and
unconditional nature of the result required. Consequently, it is the first two
conditions under the Becker ruling which confer enforceable individual
rights.
In examining the question of liability, the Court established the rule
of state liability for the failure to implement Community directives." Ruling
that the directive in question also leaves broad discretion to the Member
States for the organization of protection from bankrupt employers, the Court
held that the directive does not provide a sufficient basis for liability against
the state. "' The Court did, however, rule that the principle of state liability for
harm caused to individuals is inherent in the system of the Treaty.,, The
Court determined the failure of Member States to transpose directives
constituted a breach of Community law under which the Member States are
obliged to pay compensation for harm suffered by individuals."" In the view
of the Court,
[T]he full effectiveness of Community rules would be
impaired and the protection of the rights they grant would be
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when
their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for
which a Member State can be held responsible. The
possibility of obtaining redress by the Member State is
particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full
effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on
the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence
of such action, individuals cannot enforce before national
courts the rights granted to them by Community law."
In establishing the general rule of state liability, the Court
enumerated three conditions required for compensation under Community

Id. at 5410,
I

17.

I' at5413-5416, 28-46.
Id.
16
Id. at5412, 25.
S/d.at 5414, 35.
I/d.at 5415, 37,
Id. at5414, 33-34.
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law."' First, the result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of
rights to individuals.,' Second, it should be possible to identify the content
of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive."2 Third, a causal
link should exist between the breach of the states obligation and the harm
suffered by the injured parties."'
(B). The Brasserie and Dillenkofer Judgments
The principle of state liability has been further extended by the
European Court of Justice in the cases Brasserie" and Dillenkofer."' The
Brasserie case concerned the liability of a Member State as a result of
breaching directly applicable Treaty provisions," while tile Dillenkofer
judgment again dealt with a complete failure of a Member State to implement
a directive in due time."'
In the Brasserie judgment, the Court of Justice answered the
question of whether state liability arises when damages suffered by an
individual for breaches of Community law are the result of an act or an
omission on the part of the national legislature. The Court ruled that the
principle of state liability "holds good for any case in which a Member State
breaches Community law, whatever be the organ of the State whose act or
omission was responsible for the breach.'" More importantly, the Court drew
a parallel between the conditions of liability through actions or omission of
Member States and Community authorities. In the Court's view, and with
respect to the breach of Community law, both Member States and
Community institutions must be held liable to the same conditions when
exercising legislative powers."" Not only does this guarantee equal treatment
of injured parties irrespective of responsibility, it also makes the case law on
the issue of liability of Community institutions fully applicable for state
liability.
" Id at5415-5416, 38-43.
91 Id.at5415, 40.
92 Id
'3 Id.
94 Joined Cases 46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Federal Republic
of Germany and
The Queen v, Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd. and Others, [1996]
E.CR. L-1029.
'
Joined Cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94, Erich Dillenkofer and Others v.Federal Republic of
Germany, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4845.
" Joined Cases 46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029, 1035-1039.
'7 Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro, in Joined Cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94, Erich
Dillenkofer and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1996] EC.R. 1-4848-4850, 3-5. On
the function and duties of the Advocate-General see EC Treaty, ans. 222-223 (ex art. 166-167).
'
Joined Cases 46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. L-1029, 1145, 32.
Id at 1147, 42.
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Pursuant to these findings, the Court now distinguishes between two
different situations of breach of Community law by Community or Member
State institutions. A Member State is not only liable under the obligation to
achieve a particular result but also to act in a field where it disposes of wide
discretion.I'l Concerning the latter of the two, the Court added the premise
of a "sufficiently serious breach'"" which must appear in addition to the
2 A sufficiently serious breach
preconditions established in Francovich."'
exists where "the Member State or Community institution concerned has
manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion"'ll one of
which, of course, is the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached.', '
The Court continued to expand its measures of establishing a
sufficient serious breach of Community law in the Dillenkoferjudgment."',
Returning to the breach of failing to implement a directive in due time, the
Court noted that when a Member State "was not called upon to make any
legislative choices and had only considerably reduced, or even no discretion,
the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the
existence of a sufficiently serious breach.""" The Court concluded that where
"a Member State fails ... to take any measure necessary to achieve the result
prescribed by a directive within the period it lays down, that Member State
manifestly and gravely disregards the limits on its discretion.""'
In conclusion, the concept of direct effect has changed. Direct effect
can be achieved in different ways. If measures set in forner precedents of the
Court are violated, individual rights may still be conferred based on the
I"'at 1148, 46-47; See also Walter van Gerven, The ECJ's recent Case -Law in the field of
ld.
Tort Liability: Towards a European ]us Commune?, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE
NATIONAL JUDICIARY 91, 99 (Rosa H.M. Jansen et al. eds., 1997).
Joined Cases 46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. L.-1029, 1149, 51.
"' Id. at 1149-1155,
52-74. The individual who has suffered damages has a right to reparation
where the three following conditions are met: (a) the rule of law infringed must have been
intended to confer rights on individuals, (b) the breach must be sufficiently serious, and (c) there
must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the state and the
damage sustained by the injured parties. See also the so-called "Schoppenstedt-test", Case 5/71,
Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v.Council of the European Communities, [197 1] E.C.R.
975, 984-985, 11-16.
'' Joined Cases 46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. L-1029, 1150, 55.
04 See, e.g., case 392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte:
British Telecommunications plc,
[1996] ECR. 1.-1631, in which the Court on the basis of the "clarity and precision" rule decided
that the Member State in question, by incorrectly interpreting a directive, had not committed a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law. Id. at 1668-1669, 42-45.
"'i Joined Cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94, Erich Dillenkofer, [1996] EC.R.4845, 23-25; See
also Thomas M.J. MOillers, Doppelte Rechtsfortbildung contra legem?, Europarecht [EuR] 20,
21 (1998).
"" Joined Cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94, Erich Dillenkofer, [1996] E.CR. 4845, 25, See also
Case 5/94, The Queen v.Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parse: Hedley Lomas
(Ireland) Ltd., [1996] E.C.R. L.-2553, 2613, 28.
,'7Joined Cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94, Erich Dillenkofer, [19961 E.C.R. 4845, 26.
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principle of state liability. It appears that direct effect, regardless of vertical
or horizontal effect or other limitations, may be obtained through the
punishment of Member States that fail to comply with Community law. This
leaves open much room for uncertainty or deeper involvement of the
European Court of Justice, the most significant of which might be the
question of what measure is enough to fulfill the "granting of rights"
condition as developed by the Court."' Despite this dilemma, it is important
to realize that the case law of the European Court of Justice is primarily based
on cases in which the Member States failed to comply with their duty to take
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment
of their obligations under Community law. Out of this failure, adverse
consequences, damages and other harm had been suffered by individuals,
which, in turn, has lead to the establishment of the case law of the Court.'9
C. SUPREMACY OF COMMUNITY LAW

Supremacy of Community law is a well-established principle in the
Court's case law. The principle is fundamental to the maintenance and
application of Community law. Nevertheless, the supremacy of Community
law continues to be controversial and remains under attack from the Member
States. Many national courts have refused to apply the principle or have done
so reluctantly. Until today, in Great Britain"" and Germany,"' the idea of
supremacy has been viewed with suspicion and unease. Similar tendencies
are evident in other Member States as well." 2
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the different European Community
Treaties do not contain an explicit Supremacy Clause favoring federal over
state law. Moreover, the Treaties fail to provide a general order of
precedence or definition of the relationship between Community and national
law. The closest reference to be found in the Treaties is the general
"' Walter van Gerven, The ECJs recent Case -Law in the field of Tort Liability: Towards a
European lus Commune?, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY 91, 99-100
(Rosa H.M. Jansen et al. eds., 1997).
9 Opinion of Advocate-General Jean Misdo, in Joined Cases C-6/90 and 8/90, Francovich and
Others v. Italian Republic, [19911 E.C.R. 1-5357, 5370.
Timmermans, supra note 74, at 29, 35 with further references.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfG], BVertGE 37, 237 ("Solange
I"); BVertGE 52, 202 ("Vielleicht"); BVerfGE, in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW]
1258 (1983); ("Mittlerweile"); BVerfGE 73, 339, 387. ("Solange 11"); BVerfGE, decision of
Oct. 12, 1993, Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92 ("Maastricht"); See also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 95 (The University of Chicago Press)
(1994).
12 Opinion of Advocat-General lUger, in Case 473/93, Commission of the European Communities
v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, [19961 ECR. 1-3207, 3220-3222.
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obligation of loyalty which can also be called the principle of Community
Comity. ' The principle constitutes a general obligation of cooperation
between the Member States and the Community.'" Nevertheless, it cannot
be enforced and is only able to create a stigma of noncompliance, lack of
commitment or inadequate loyalty. As a powerful tool in international law,
the latter may sufficiently serve as an incentive for Member States to
cooperate and fulfill their obligations. However, the principle of Community
Comity does not constitute a particular rule on the supremacy or primacy of
Community law.
The European Court of Justice derives the primacy of Community
law from the direct applicability and purview of the law or the entering into
force of Community Treaties. Fundamental in this determination was the
Court's ruling in the case Costa v. ENEL."' Italy nationalized its electricity
industry and transferred their property to a new organization, Ente Nazionale
per L 'EnergiaElettrica (ENEL)."' , The nationalization took place in 1962,
after the Community Treaties entered into force. Costa, an Italian national
and lawyer, challenged a utility bill in the amount of roughly $3.08 which
was issued to him by the new organization, ENEL." He argued the
nationalization of the electricity industry violated the Italian Constitution and
the EC Treaty.", The Italian court commissioner of venue presented the case
to the Italian Constitutional Court which rejected the argument by Costa.'"
Despite this outcome, Costa continued to challenge the utility bills issued to
EC Treaty, art. 10 (ex. art. 5): "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general of particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty."; See also CARL OTTO LENZ,
KOMMENTAR ZU DEM VERTRAG ZUR GRUNDUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN art.
5 (Bundesanzeiger-Verlagsgesellschaft) (1994); John Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC
Treaty: The Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of the Court ofJustice, 10
FORDHAM INT'L L.J, 503 (1987); John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article
5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645 (1990).
" Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-GroBmarkte GmbH & Co.
KG, [1971] E.C.R. 487, 499, para. 5; Joined Cases 209-213/84, Ministere public v. Lucas Asjes
and Others, Andrew Gray and Others, Andrew Gray and Others, Jacque Maillot and Others and
LUo Ludwig and Others, [1986] E.C.R. 1425, 1471, 70; Case 213/89, The Queen v. Secretary
of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and Others, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, 2473, 19;
Case 217/88, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany,
[19901 E.CR. 1-2879, 2907, 33.
" Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nationale per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), [1964] E.C.R. 585.
I16 Id. at 588.
117 Id. at 588; See also ERIC STEIN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS WITH VOLUME OF DOCUMENTS 202 (Bobbs-Merrill Co.)
(1976).
"x Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa, [1964] ECR. 585, 588-591.

"

""

Id. at 589.
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him. On his second appeal, the court commissioner sought a preliminary
ruling from the European Court of Justice on the proper interpretation of the
Treaty provisions in dispute. 2 While finding that Community law has
primacy over conflicting Member State law,' 2' the Court ruled that the
nationalization of the electricity industry in Italy violated Community law.' 2
On the subject of the primacy of Community law, the Court held:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry
into force of the Treaty, became the integral part of the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts are
bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its
own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the
international plane and, more particularly, real powers
stemming fron a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of
powers from the States to the Community, the Member States
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both
their nationals and themselves .... 2 follows from all
these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, could not, because of its special
and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community law and without the legal basis of
the Community itself being called into question. The transfer
by the States from their domestic legal system to the
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of
their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral
act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail."'

at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

124 Id
21
122
121
124

592.
593-594.

597-598.
593, 7.
594, 4-5. Note that misconceptions seem evident when the Court states that "[the legal

system of the EEC Treaty] became an integral part of the legal system of the Member States,
•, ." This conveys the impression that Community law was directly transformed into the legal
systems of the Member States, standing in clear contrast to the doctrine of direct applicability
and direct effect. The Courts further reasoning in the case, however, indicates that this wording
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In its ruling, the European Court of Justice refused to question the
motivation of the plaintiff to challenge a utility bill of minor amount.
Moreover, the Court did not answer all preliminary questions brought to its
attention and predominately focused on the relationship between Community
and national law. Thus, while establishing the basis for judicial review, the
Court, analogous to the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Marbury v.
Madison,'" did not apply its ruling in a consequent manner. The European
Court of Justice did not fully exercise its standard of judicial review.
Consistent with the character of preliminary rulings before the European
Court of Justice, the case ultimately had to be decided by national courts.
There the litigation on behalf of the plaintiff ended without a result on the
merits. Costa was denied standing to challenge the nationalization of the
Italian electricity industry. 11
The European Court of Justice expanded Community law primacy
in cases following Costa v. ENEL. For example, the Court ruled much later
that Community law enjoys primacy over national constitutional law in
InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft.'" In this case, the Court held that "the
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot
be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as
formulated by the constitution of that State or the principle of a national
constitutional structure."'"
Indeed, the failure by the founding Member States to include an
explicit Supremacy Clause in the Community Treaties did not prevent the
Court from inferring one. The Court thereby constitutionalized the legal
structure of the Community while continuously emphasizing legal unity in the
Community.''

refers to the procedural obligation of the Member States to directly apply Community law where
necessary. Id. at 594, 2.
'25Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
12, GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 195
(West) (1993).
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle for Getreide
und Futtermittel, [19701 E.C R. 1125, 1134, 3-4.
2 Id.at 1134, 13.
1 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (I1), [1978] E.C.R.
127

629, 640-645; Case 213/89, The Queen v.Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame
Ltd. and Others, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, 2467-2475.
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D. IMPLIED POWERS
As one interpretation, direct applicability, direct effect, and
supremacy stand in the context of increased efficiency of the Community and
its ability to perform."' Pursuant to this interpretation, the Community
requires corresponding instruments and powers, that is, additional and
extended powers. By their very nature, these powers must be established by
the European Court of Justice itself. Considering that direct applicability,
direct effect and supremacy are primarily based on precedents set forth by the
Court, these doctrines, in their application, drive the extension of Community
law. In other words, employing these doctrines essentially commands the
coherent adaptation of Community powers by the Court.
The definition of powers through precedent does not follow a typical
mode for a federal state. With few exceptions, powers in a federal state are
allocated asymmetrically.' ' While the federal level is empowered to exercise
only specifically enumerated powers, the constituent units are left with an
unspecified residuum of powers. In theory, this arrangement is meant to
protect the lower level by creating a constitutional presumption in their favor.
Although the Community Treaties constitute conferred powers or
compdtences d'attributionwhich can be interpreted as enumerated powers,
the Treaties do not include a detailed definition of powers or their limits.
The European Community Treaty merely determines that "[t]he tasks
entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by [their] ...institutions..
. Each institution shall act within the limits ofpowers conferred upon it by
this Treaty.""' 2 In addition, the Treaties include an universal authorization of
powers, such as the approximation of laws"' and an equivalent to the
necessary and proper clause found in the Constitution of the United States of
America. The "necessary and proper clause" of the Community Treaties
states that
[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary to
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market,
one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has
not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after

''
'3'

12
"

Weiler, supra note 7, at 2415.
The best exception is Canada. See Michael Burgess, Canadian Federalism: Past, Present and
Future (Leicester University Press) (1990).
EC Treaty, art. 7 (ex art. 4). Emphasis added.
EC Treaty, arts. 94-95 (ex arts. 166-167).
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consulting the European Parliament, take appropriate
measures.'
The European Court of Justice expansively interpreted Community
powers and developed an implied power theory which closely resembles that
of the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland."' The European
Court of Justice, in particular, did not rely on any implied power explicitly
found within the Treaties. Rather, the Court determined that "[t]he rules laid
down by an international treaty or a law presupposes the rules without which
that treaty or law would have no meaning or could not be reasonably and
usefully applied.""' The Court held that the institutions which are responsible
for ensuring the application of such rules enjoy "independence in determining
the implementing measures necessary" and accordingly have the "assumed"
power to adopt corresponding measures.' Later, the Court more specifically
noted that
where an article of the EEC Treaty... confers a specific task
on the Commission, it must be accepted, if that provision is
not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the
Commission necessarily and per se the powers which are
indispensable in order to carry out that task.'"
The treaty-making powers and the powers on external relations of
the Community provided the basis for the Court's doctrine on implied
powers. In the ERTA case,"' the question before the Court was whether the
Member States lose their individual legislative power on a particular issue if
the Community had already legislated on the subject matter and that matter
was not part of a conferred power to the Community. In ERTA, five of the
then six Member States entered into a European Road Transport Agreement
(ERTA) with other European states. The agreement on the harmonization of
labor regulations in road transport never came into effect."" As a result, the
negotiations on the agreement were latter reopened with all Member States.
14

EC Treaty, art. 308 (ex art. 235). Emphasis added.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority (F~dechar), [1954-1956]
EC.R.245.
137Id
""
Joined cases 281, 283-285 and 287/85, Federal Republic of Germany v.Commission of the
European Communities, [1987] E.C. R. 3203, 3253, 28.
, Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities (ERTA), [1971] E.C.R. 263.
"'

''

""

Id. at 265-266.
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The Member States decided to negotiate on their own behalf and become
individual parties of the agreement."' In the meantime, before the negotiation
had been reopened, the European Council of Ministers had adopted a
regulation on the same general subject."' This caused the Commission to
challenge the intended negotiations of the European Road Transport
Agreement outside the framework of the Community."' The Commission
claimed that since the Community had enacted a regulation and legislated on
the same subject matter, the negotiations no longer could be left to the
Member States."' The Commission contended that the Community's internal
powers on common transport policy would apply to external relations as well.
"I Any other interpretation would jeopardize the powers conferred on the
Community.1 The Commission argued that even if this power were not part
of the sphere of transport, it would tend to become an exclusive Community
power by the time a common policy is implemented by the Community." 7
The Council, as the defending party, held the opposite position. It
argued that since the Community only has such power as had been conferred
on it, authority to enter into agreements with third countries could not be
assumed in the absence of an express provision in the Treaty."' Assuming the
opposite were true, such authorities at best could be determined concurrent
powers to be shared with the Member States."'
The Advocate-General in the ERTA case'"" stated that the authors of
the Treaty of Rome intended to strictly limit the Community's authority in
external matters to cases explicitly stated.'"' The Advocate-General argued
that any other interpretation by the Court would exceed the bounds ofjudicial

"'
142

'3

Id. at 266.

Regulation No. 543/69 on the Harmonization of Certain Social Legislation relating to Road
Transport (March 25, 1969), 1969 O.J. (L 77) 49,
Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European

Communities (ERTA), [1971] E.C.R. 263, 266.
According to the Commission "Member States retain their power only so long as the Community
has not exercised its own; that is, has not in fact adopted common provisions. Conversely,
where and to the extent to which the Community actually laid down such regulations, Member
States lose their authority to legislate at the same level, and can only be called upon to take such
measures as may be necessary to implement the Community provisions." Id. at 270.
"i
ld. at 269-271.
",
Id at 270.
"I
Id. at 271-272.
I ld. at 273, 9.
Id. at 274, 1.
'i
Opinion of Advocate-General Alain Dutheillet de Lamothe, in Case 22/70, Commission of the
European Communities v. Council of the European Communities (ERTA), [1971] E.C.R. 263,
284-295.
"'
Id at 293.
"'
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review.' 2 Furthermore, the Advocate-General noted that the recognition of
an extended Community authority in external matters would implicate the

existence of implied powers.' - Implied powers of that kind would be similar
to those with which the Supreme Court of the United States supplemented the
powers of the federal bodies in relation to those of the confederated States.'
The Court of Justice ultimately decided in favor of the Commission's
argument. The Court ruled that the entire scheme of the Treaty must be

considered.'" The authority in external treaty-making powers would arise not
only from an express conferment by the Treaty, but may equally flow from
other provisions of the Treaty or measures adopted by the Community
institutions."', It concluded that
[a]lthough it is true that [the Treaty does] not expressly confer
on the Community authority to enter into international
agreements, nevertheless the bringing into force ... of [a]

regulation... necessarily vest[s] in the Community power to
enter into any agreements with third countries relating to the
subject matter governed by [the] regulation.'"
According to the Court, the negotiations on the European Road
Transport Agreement fell within the scope of the regulation the Council had
enacted on the same general subject matter."' The Community therefore had
been empowered to negotiate and conclude the agreement and the Member
States were excluded from the possibility of concurrent powers.'"
Hence, the Court in ERTA held that the grant of internal powers must
be read as implying an external treaty making power. This finding is of
['2

The Advocate-General raised the hypothetical question: "Is it not the case that to recognize that

the Community has implied powers with regard to negotiations with third countries would far
exceed the intentions of the authors of the Treaty and of the States which signed and accepted
it?This is my view, and it is the principle reason which brings me to propose to the Court a
relatively strict interpretation of the Treaty in this sphere. Such, then, are the reasons why I
consider that the contested proceedings of the Council were not conducted within the context
of a Community authority established by the Treaty and that consequently they do not constitute
a Community act which may be reviewed by the Court..." Id at 294.
Id.at 293.
' Id.at 293: Compare also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.416 (1920), 40 S.Ct. 382; United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
'" Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities (ERTA), [1971] E.C.R. 263, 274, 15.
"'i' Id. at 274,
16.
'"
Id. at 275, 28.
30.
', Id.at 275,
"
Id. at 276, 31. In fact, the Court further substantiated its reasoning with the remark that any
step taken outside the framework of the Community institutions would be incompatible with the
unity of the common market and the uniform application of Community law. Id.
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importance as it goes well beyond the issue of treaty-making power. The
decision was subsequently applied in a variety of contexts which
demonstrates the extensive meaning of the Courts implied power doctrine.'"
The Court applied its doctrine of implied powers through a teleological and
result-oriented perspective. Powers are implied in favor of the Community
whenever such powers are found necessary to serve a legitimate purpose. As
such, this interpretation includes the deliberate abandonment of minimized
preemption of state sovereignty as a standing rule of interpretation in
international law.'1"
E. FUNDAMENTAL AND BASIC RIGHTS
Similar to its lack of a Supremacy Clause, the Community Treaties
contain no Bill of Rights. Although the Member States recently adopted a
Charter of Fundamental Rights at the European Council Meeting in Nice in
December 2000,161 until today, the establishment of fundamental and basic
rights has remained under the auspices of the European Court of Justice.
Since the 1960s, the Court has reviewed Community measures for any
',

""

See, e.g., Joined Cases 281, 283-285 and 287/85, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission
of the European Communities, [19871 E.C.R. 3203, 3248-3257; See also Antonio Tizzano, Les
Comp~tences de la Communauti in Trente ans de droit Communautaire 45, 49-52 (European
Commission, Perspectives Europeennes) (1982).
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-299 (Clarendon
Press) (1998). With regard to the doctrine of exclusivity and preemption, See M. Waelbroeck,
The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption, Consent and Redelegalion, in COURTS AND
FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 548-580

(Terrance

Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 1982). On the relationship between Community and Member State
powers, the Court held that the power of the Community in the field of economics and common
commercial policy are exclusive, thus precluding Member States from taking any legislative
actions which might have discriminatory or equivalent effect. See, Case 5/74, Procureur du Roi
v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, 5; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale
AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung for Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] E.C.R. 649, 664,
8-15. For the most recent development, See Joined Cases 267 and 268/91, Criminal
Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097. The latter
cases cast into doubt the premises of the Cassis ruling and overrule Dassonville while setting
qualifying standards. Id. at 6131, 16. Most interesting is the motivation expressed by the
Court. The Court stated that "[i]n view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Art. 30
of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial
freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court
considers it necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter." Id at 6131, 14.
162 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europen Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. Note, however,
that the matter of the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights remains yet to be decided
by the Member States, See Precidency Conclusions Nice European Council Meeting 7, 8 and 9
December 2000, http://europe.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec2000/dec2OOOeu.pdf, page 1, point
2. For previous legislative initiatives and amendments through the Treaty of Maastricht and the
Treaty of Amsterdam, See 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1; 1982 O.J. (C 304) 253; 1989 (C 120); 1989 (C
158); See also TEU art. 6 (ex art. F); EC Treaty, arts.
18-22 (ex
arts. 8a-8e).
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violation of fundamental rights. By adopting constitutional traditions
common in Germany and Italy as well as the principles of international
human rights conventions, the Court has set precedents under which the
1
protection of basic rights became an inherent part of the Community law. '
In Stauder v. City of Ulm,'16 the European Court of Justice held that

fundamental human rights are enshrined in the general principles of
6
Community law which are to be protected by the European Court of Justice.'1
In InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,the Court added that "[t]he protection
of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and
objectives of the Community."'' ' 6 Since Nold v. Commission,' ' the Court has

referred directly to the International Human Rights Convention and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. " On the basis of these international conventions the Court
established the right of property,' the right to a fair trial,'"' the inviolability
of the home,"' the prohibition of retroactive criminal law,"' and the right to
free speech." ' In addition, the Court's case law on equal protection" and the
See, e.g., DEHOUSSE, supra note 7, at 62-69; Paul Leleux, The Role of the European Court of
Justice in Protecting Individual Rights in the Context of the Free Movement of Persons and
Services, in COURTS AND FREE MARKET: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 385, 386-387 (Terrance Sandalow, Eric Stein eds., 1982).
164 Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, [1969] E.C.R.
419, 424-426.
"61 Id. at 425,
7.; See also Case 130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities,
[1976] E.C.R. 1589, 1597-1599, 8-18.
66 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide
und Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134, 4.
167 Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffliandlung v. Commission of
the European
Communities, [1974] E.C.R. 491.
166 Id. at 507-508,
12-14; See also Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v. Minister of the Interior, [1975]
1219, 1232, 32. The International Human Rights Convention and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had been signed and ratified by
all Member States.
1"9 Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, [19791 E.C.R. 3727, Joined Cases 41, 121, and
796/79, Testa et al, [1980] 1979.
"" Case 98/79, Pescastaing, [1980] E.C.R. 691; Case 222/84, Maguerite Johnston v. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1681-1683, 13-21.
' Case 136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, [1980] E.C.R. 2033; Joined Cases
46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission of the European Communities, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, 2922-2924, 10-19.
72 Case 62/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk, [1984] E.C.R. 2689, 2718, 21-23; See also Case 61/79,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana, [1980] E.CR. 1205, on the
retroactive effect of the European Court of Justice rulings.
' Case 100/88, Augustine Oyowe and Amadou Traore v. Commission of the European
Communities, [1989] 4285, 4305-4310.
"'
Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Socidtd Anonyme Beige de Navigation Adrienne Sabena,
[1976] E.C.R. 455, 471480, 4-68; Case 262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v. Guardian Royal
Exchange Assurance Group, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1889, 1948-1955, 1 10-39; Joined Cases 103,
145/77, Royal Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Limited v. Intervention Board for Agricultural
",'
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corresponding Treaty provisions is of commensurate importance.'" The
Court's application of common legal principles, such as proportionality,'legal certainty,'' and legitimate expectations,'7" are clearly classified as
fundamental rights.
In the past, the European Court of Justice refused to review Member
State laws for possible violations of fundamental rights.', However, with the
continuing elaboration of fundamental rights through its case law, the Court,
in the application of such rights, has once again set the premise for the
expansion of its jurisdiction to review Member State laws."'" The fundamental
and basic rights inherent in the principles of Community law therefore
became significant for the interpretation of different Treaty provisions.
Likewise, these principles indirectly influenced the judicial review of national
legislation by the European Court of Justice."''
The judicial development of fundamental and basic rights in the case
law of the European Court of Justice provides a sufficient safeguard for all
Communitycitizens. " It can be argued that the Court created an effective
instrument to check the arrogation of powers to the Community implicit in its
own doctrines. This is all the more significant, as the Community does not
provide for an adequate and fully effective democratic body with the power
to check the lawfulness of Community legislation. Nevertheless, the example
of fundamental rights in the case law of the European Court of Justice
demonstrates the continuing activism of the Court. Described by other
commentators as "audacious self-perception,"' " the Court, by way of creative
interpretation of the Treaties, has progressed in a manner similar to a
Produce, Tunnel Refineries Limited. v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, [1978]
E C.R. 2037, 2072, 1 26-27.
"'
See, e.g., EEC Treaty, Art. 7, EC Treaty arts. 39, 43, 49, and 141 (ex arts. 48, 52, 59, and 119).
17"Case 114/76, Bela-Mfihle Josef Bergmann KG v.Grows-Farm GmbH & Co. KG, [1977] E.C.R.
1211, 1220-1221, 15-7.
'"
Case 108/81, G. R. Amylum v. Council of the European Communities, [19821 E.C.R. 3107,
3130, 1 4.
""
Case 112/77, August Topfer & Co.GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, [1978]
E.C.R. 1019, 1032-1033, $ 18-20; Case 169/80, Administration des Douanes v. Societd
Anonyme Garancini, [1981] E.C.R. 1931, 1942, 17-18; Case 368/89, Antonio Crispoltoni v.
Fattoria Automata Tabacchi di CittA di Castello, [19911 E.C.R. 1-3695, 3719-3720, T 13-17.
"'
Case 60 and 61/84 , Cindtheque SA and Others v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais,
[1985] E.C.R. 2605, 2627, $ 26; Case 12/86, Meryemn Demirel v.Stadt Schwabisch Gemind
(Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey, Freedom of Movement for Workers),
[1987] E.C.R. 3719, 3754, 28.
"''
Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios
Kouvelas, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2925, 2963-2964, 41-44.
"''
Case 222/84, Maguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [19861
E.CR. 1651, 1682,1 18.
"''
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfG] (FR.G.), Case BvR 197/83,
BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II).
"''
Weiler, supra note 7, at 2417.
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constitutional court in a constitutional polity or state-like forum."' Despite
the controversial perception of such case law, the background of the
continuous growth of the Court's jurisprudence must be taken into account.
Triggered by the failure of Member States to fulfill their obligations, the
Court developed a rule of law based on its case law and the development of
precedents. This development set into motion the preemption of national
powers and legislation. At the same time, the Court continued to establish
checks and balances on newly established Community powers. By invoking
fundamental rights and constitutionalizing the legal structure of the
Community Treaties, the Court prevented the unrestricted application of the
concepts of law established in its own precedents."'

III. CONCLUSION
The European Court of Justice has been and remains a major
integration force for the European Communities. The Court is particularly
responsible for the development and elaboration of the relationship between
Community law and Member States and has delineated it much like the
relationship in a constitutional federal state. Furthermore, the Court has
distinctly set forth a definition of separation of powers and the primacy of
Community law. Clearly, the failure of the Member States as the signing
parties of the Community Treaties to include such definitions did not prevent
the Court from introducing them.
Indeed, the role of the European Court of Justice, with minor
exceptions, shares close resemblance with the constitutional role of courts in
the United States of America. The debate by constitutional scholars in the
United States', has been conducted in much the same manner as with regard
1"4

Id.

""

The development of fundamental and basic rights in the case law of the European Court of
Justice once again shows resemblance with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly the
doctrine of incorporation and the substantive content of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The doctrine of
incorporation is most clearly described in a dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Poe v.
Ullmann. He stated: "[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided
in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points picked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; ... It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints, . . and which also recognizes ....
that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement." Poe v.
Ullmann, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan J., dissenting). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11-2 to § 11-5, 772-784 (The Foundation Press) (1988).
See, e.g., W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role ofCourts, 1990 Wis.L. REv. 1071.
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to the European Court of Justice. In both cases, the question remains whether
the courts should be allowed to make law or simply be limited to the
interpretation of law according to the intent of the legislative body which
enacted it. The issue is inseparable from the question of the proper role of
courts in a democratic system. Furthermore, as in the United States, the role
of the Court of Justice in Europe includes consideration of encroachment and
preemption of separate sovereign entities by a higher authority. It
contemplates the centralization of governance and the fact that courts are too
powerful, making policy decisions best left to others.
However, the European Community, with six Member States, has
expanded to a Union with over 380 Million citizens and fifteen Member
States, notwithstanding further membership considerations. Moreover, since
the Founding Treaties, communism has descended, Europe is no longer
divided, and the role of globalization, an economically and politically
interdependent world, has greatly increased. Without a doubt, the face of the
European Communities has changed. The European Union has become
increasingly political, more state-like, and not limited to economic
cooperation.
At the sane time, the Member States have proven responsible for
many of the cases brought before the Court. The Member States have not
only failed to fulfill their obligations under the Community Treaties but also
failed to expeditiously amend the Treaties in a manner analog to the
challenges encountered by the Communities. Thus, the European Court of
Justice in many cases was left with making political decisions and law
through creative interpretation of Treaty provisions. That is not to justify
judicial legislation by the Court. Instead, the Member States have often
simply relied on the Court to regulate political conflict or solve their own
inability to find political compromise.
To be sure, Member States have always remained hesitant to confer
additional powers on the Community or to establish a European Parliament
consisting of a democratic legislative body similar to those of national
parliaments. The progress of constitutional development or efficient advance
in European integration is cumbersome, and with respect to national interests,
too erratic to answer rapid changes in global societies. Nevertheless, as long
as the Member States are or at least pretend to be committed to European
political and economic integration, it remains their responsibility to make the
necessary political and legislative decisions in the appropriate forum. The
Member States cannot rely on the judicial branch to make unpopular
decisions.

